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The LHC experiments, due to their complexity and size, present many safety challenges.
Cryogenic gases are used in large quantities as well as certain flammable mixtures. The
electrical power involved calls for analysis of the fire risks. Access is restricted to the
minimum and environmental conditions are extremely harsh, due to strong magnetic fields
and ionising radiation. This paper will describe the Combined Fire/Gas/Oxygen deficiency
Detection systems proposed for inside the ATLAS and CMS Experiments and possibly for the
two others, if they deem it necessary. The requirements of the experiments and the
development and implementation of such a system will be discussed. In parallel, commercial
procedures to implement these systems by industry shall be described, taking into
consideration that a previous development has already been undertaken by CERN for the LEP
experiments. The stage is set for inter-divisional collaboration in a project of utmost
importance for the safety of people and protection of the investment.
21 INTRODUCTION
For the LHC Experiments, a great number of alarm systems shall be installed in different locations: on
the surface, in the underground technical and experimental caverns and inside the Experimental
Apparatus. In this paper, only the latter shall be discussed.
Both the ATLAS and the CMS Experiment have requested the installation of alarm systems
capable of detecting different hazards developing inside the volume of the Experimental Apparatus.
These consist of Fire in an incipient stage, the presence of Flammable Gas or Low Oxygen levels
dangerous for human life.
The ST Division has been charged with developing and supplying such systems for these
experiments, and would like to be ready to receive similar requests coming from the remaining two
experiments, ALICE and LHCb.
2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Because of the lack of space and hostile environment, such a system can almost only consist of a
network of air sampling perforated tubes accessing the inside of the Experimental Apparatus. These
tubes would bring a sample of the air present inside the Experiment Volumes to detection equipment
placed outside.
Due to the nature of this project, the name SNIFFER (System to Nail Important Fire and
Flammable gas Experimental Risks) is proposed.
This project shall be executed by CERN’s industrial partners specialised in this field, with the
requirements and supervision by CERN.
Figure 1 Principle of Air Sampling Detection
The technique is known and widely applied in industry and consists of a tube connected to a
pump with a detection device in the middle. (Figure 1). However CERN is requiring a simultaneous
detection of three different phenomenon: Smoke, Flammable Gas and Oxygen deficiency. This is a
complex combination, taking into account the very different aeraulic characteristics of smoke and gas
detection. The former has very sensitive detectors capable of detecting the most minute particle of
smoke and works generally with high air flows and large tube diameters (~20mm). The latter has less
sensitive detectors and works with less air flow and smaller tube diameters (~6~8mm)
The large dimension of the experiments presents a further difficulty. Being located more than
100 m underground and of cylindrical form, ATLAS spans approximately 40m in length and 25m in
height (see Figure 2). This will make for very long lengths of the sampling tubes and consequently
high pressure drops, implying high power pumps. High power pumps in turn take up space, and space













3Figure 2 Basic illustration of the foreseen location of the sampling tubes (red lines) in ATLAS
3 THE LEP EXPERIENCE
For the detection of fire and flammable gas inside the LEP (Large Electron-Positron) Experiments the
EST/LEA group built, more than 10 years ago, the SDN (Sampling Detection and Neutralization)
system. This system applied the air sampling principle described above to detect hazards inside the
experiment. It had the additional capability of injecting an extinguishing gas to neutralize any incipient
fire.
Twenty of these systems were installed in the LEP Experiments, and provide an invaluable
return of experience to aid in the design of the new systems.
It was developed and produced at CERN and is described in detail in [1].
4 REQUIREMENTS AND TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS
4.1 Basic Requirements
The basic requirements from the experiment’s point of view is of extreme simplicity:
- The SNIFFER must be able to detect inside the Experiment:
- Smoke presence (indication of fire)
- Flammable Gas due to a leak
- Low Oxygen levels due to a leak of inert Gas.
- The response time must be within 100 seconds
4.2 Quantities
Because of the dimension of the Experiments, they have been divided into volumes inside which the
detection system must work, but they are not isolated from the each other. The volumes are only
representations of areas inside the detector.
For example the ATLAS detector has been divided into slices, each being a volume, and the
ATLAS Group has estimated the need for approximately 250 tubes. CMS is estimated to require
approximately 200, and the other two Experiments 50 each.
4.3 Constraints
The main constraints on the SNIFFER are Distances and Response Time, Space and Location,
Radiation, Magnetic field and Access. All these constraints are interconnected.
4The response time depends heavily on the length of the sampling tube. The response time is the
sum of the air transport time and the analysis time. The longer the tube for a given air speed, the
longer the transport time. So length should be minimized and is expected to be on average of 100m.
As mentioned before, space is a valuable asset underground. The choice has to be made between
installing the analysis equipment in the Experimental Cavern or in the Service Cavern.
If installed in the Experimental Cavern, distances and response time will be minimized but the
environment is hostile with Radiation and Magnetic Fields perturbing the functioning of the system
and degrading performances.
If installed in the Service Cavern distances will be much longer, and consequently the pressure
drops shall increase, calling for larger pumps that take up more space. The environment is no longer
hostile, but the air passing inside the detection system has to be re-injected into the experimental
cavern because of possible radioactive dust. The equipment itself may become slightly active and may
constitute a radiological problem inside the Service Cavern.
Furthermore the Experimental Cavern is under strict Access Control, creating difficulties for
maintenance and repair operations. The presence of the whole system in the Service Cavern would
ease the maintenance operations.
Due to the large number of detectors needed a solution must be found so as to take up the
minimum space. The maximum number of tubes must be analyzed using the minimum number of
racks. This may call for solutions such as multiplexing of tubes or development of very small sensors.
4.4 Reliability
The SNIFFER must also guarantee reliability and performance, and must undergo a detailed functional
analysis, and be able to demonstrate that it complies to the SIL2 (Safety Integrity Level 2) as specified
in the IEC 61508 [2].
4.5 Integration into CSAM
Of course the SNIFFER must also integrate with CSAM (CERN Safety Alarm Monitoring) system. It
must be able to transmit its information (e.g. analogue values, alarms, faults, state changes, etc…) via
a communication protocol compatible with the CERN standards, and be able to activate safety actions
and emergency shutdown operations. For more on the CSAM system see [3]
5 PROJECT ORGANISATION
The project should have a structure and its main actors should be organized in such a way as to define
the requirements, provide resources, monitor and control progress and performance.
For this purpose, we propose the classic project-management structure (see Figure 3):
- Product Owner – Maître d’Ouvrage
- Product Manager – Maître d’Ouvrage Délégué
- Project Owner – Maître d’Oeuvre
- Project Leader – Maître d’Oeuvre Délégué
Each Experiment shall have its own Product Owner and Product Manager. In fact, there shall be
four different projects, with four different Product Owners and Product Managers, but with the same
Project Owner and Project Leader.
For each Experiment the Product Owner should be the corresponding Experiment coordinator,
and the Product Manager should be the corresponding GLIMOS (Group Leader In Matters Of Safety).
The Project Owner should then be the hierarchy of the ST Division charged with accomplishing
this project, who delegate the execution to the Project Leader, the ST/AA/AS section leader. He shall
coordinate the internal CERN collaborators, as well as insure a correct follow-up of the project and its
implementation by the industry.
5All Experiments will be slightly different in its constraints and requirements, so it is logical that
each case is treated as a separate project in spite of the common need.
Figure 3 Proposed Project Organization
6 PROJECT MILESTONES
This project shall be developed by CERN’s industrial suppliers and should respect internal purchasing
procedures. The standard Market Survey followed by Technical Specification must be respected. In
parallel however, some development will be sponsored by CERN, due to the novelty of this project.
To make sure that the performances requested by CERN are achievable, prototypes shall be
developed to validate the detection principles and assure that the defined detection levels are
acceptable.
The objective of this prototyping phase is to learn by experimenting, so that an adequate system
can be designed. A functional analysis must be performed on the detection system, to guarantee that it
offers functionality and reliability. Testing protocols must be defined for the final system.
A final Technical Specification shall then be written in order to select the supplier of the
systems to be installed
During the Experiment assembly, the air sampling tubes must be installed in collaboration with
the experiments and inserted into their assembly schedules. A very close co-ordination shall be
necessary during this stage.
The main milestones can be enumerated as follows with their indicative dates
• Market Survey (10/2000)
• Prototyping started (02/2001)
• Definition of first constraints (06/2001)
• Validation of Prototype (09/2001)
• Final Specification and Invitation to Tender (01/2002)



































6Between the start of the prototyping and its Validation the milestone referring to First
Constraints is of crucial importance. Due to the CMS assembly schedule, the first tubes have to be
assembled with the detector in June 2001. At this date, the dimensions of the tubes must be
determined, so that no further intervention is needed to install tubes in an already assembled
experiment.
7 CONCLUSION
The final goal of this project is to ensure the safety of the personnel entering the experiment, and
prevent any major damage to the invaluable equipment in the LHC Experiments.
This challenging project, within a complex organization is also technically challenging, pushing
our industrial partners to provide ingenious solutions and CERN to new approaches to engineering
projects. No longer are they performed in-house, but instead rely on the competence of industry. In
this sense a strong collaboration is required between CERN and its industrial suppliers, who have up
to now provided many useful ideas.
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